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1031 
AVOIDING RESPONSIBILITY:  THE CASE FOR 
AMENDING THE DUTY TO DISCLOSE PRIOR ART IN 
PATENT LAW 
John O. Curry* 
Abstract: Federal regulation requires patent applicants in the United States to disclose to 
the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) a wide range of references that might 
be material to their invention’s patentability. Applicant disclosure of prior art currently plays 
a large role in the prosecution and litigation of patents. The effects are quite deleterious, 
resulting in the filing of unnecessary references that go unreviewed in the USPTO and 
providing plausible grounds for the assertion of inequitable conduct defenses in patent 
infringement actions. This Comment looks at the history of the laws that evolved into the 
codified duty to disclose prior art and finds that the historical rationales no longer justify such 
an imposition. It also examines several foreign jurisdictions that differ from the United States 
in their mandates to disclose prior art, ultimately recommending the adoption of the standard 
used by the European Patent Office as a way to resolve both the administrative and legal 
challenges posed by the current standard. 
INTRODUCTION 
The year 2017 marked the fiftieth anniversary of President Lyndon 
Johnson’s Commission on the Patent System, created to conduct the first 
comprehensive reconceptualization of patent law in the United States 
since 1836.1 The Commission’s Report (“Report”) has had significant 
influence on the patent laws in the years since its introduction,2 and over 
the years, many of its recommendations have found a place in American 
patent law.3 But one change that followed the Report has grown to have 
                                                   
* J.D. Candidate, University of Washington School of Law, Class of 2020. I would like to thank 
Hayley J. Talbert for allowing me to pursue my individual interest in beginning this research, and 
my colleagues on Washington Law Review for their work in making this Comment worthy of 
publication. 
1. S. REP. NO. 71-184 (1967). 
2. See Patent System and Harmonization Act of 1992: Hearing on S. 2605 and H.R. 4978 Before 
the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary and the 
Subcomm. on Intellectual Prop. and Judicial Admin. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 
111–12 (1993) (statement of Robert B. Benson, President, Bancroft Corporation); S. REP. NO. 96-
617, at 11 (1980). 
3. The Report recommended the implementation of a first-to-file system, provisional applications, 
and published applications. See S. REP. NO. 71-184 (1967). Those features were eventually enacted 
by Congress. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284, 285 (2011) 
(moving the United States to a first-to-file system); Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 
103-465, 108 Stat. 4809, 4986–87 (allowing for the filing of provisional patent applications); District 
of Columbia Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501, 1536 (1999) (incorporating 
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an altogether deleterious effect: the codified duty to disclose prior art to 
the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), as set forth in 
37 C.F.R. § 1.56.4 This rule requires applicants to submit any reference 
they know to be material to the patentability of their application, and 
carries an exceedingly harsh penalty for failure under the judicial doctrine 
of inequitable conduct.5 Searching for, gathering, and submitting such a 
tremendous amount of information imposes vast costs on applicants 
seeking to comply with USPTO regulations, and the USPTO’s own 
guidelines suggest submission of anything that could possibly be 
characterized as prior art.6 
Recent scholarship has largely focused on judicial standards 
surrounding inequitable conduct and whether those benchmarks set by the 
Federal Circuit’s landmark decision in Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, 
Dickinson & Co.7 can alleviate these problems.8 This Comment proposes 
that the true problem may be further upstream, and that what needs reform 
is not the inequitable conduct doctrine, but rather the codified disclosure 
requirements that constitute a portion of the duty of candor placed on 
patent applicants.9 Approaching the problem from this direction has 
several advantages. Not only will removing the statutory duty to disclose 
prior art block the simplest avenue to spurious inequitable conduct claims, 
it will also save applicants the expense of compiling the required 
references and spare the examiner the exhaustion of sorting through 
references of debatable relevance. This solution is easier to implement 
than modifying the judicial standard, as Congress or the USPTO can alter 
the relevant rules. 
                                                   
by reference S. 1948, 106th Cong. (1999), requiring patent applications to be published after 
eighteen  months).  
4. Lawrence Pope, Inconsistency Should Not be Materiality: The Flaws in 37 C.F.R. Sec. 
1.56(B)(2), 10 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 491, 493 (2011). 
5. See DAVID HRICIK & MERCEDES MEYER, PATENT ETHICS 129–34 (2009) (discussing the 
difficulty of complying with this requirement while avoiding charges of inequitable conduct). 
6. Id. “When in doubt, it is desirable and safest to submit information. Even though the attorney, 
agent, or applicant doesn’t consider it necessarily material, someone else may see it differently and 
embarrassing questions can be avoided.” U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF 
COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINATION PROCEDURE § 2004(10) (9th ed. 2017). 
7. 649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Therasense Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co. raised the threshold 
required to prove inequitable conduct by applicants in patent prosecution. See infra section III.C. 
8. See generally Christopher A. Cotropia, Modernizing Patent Law’s Inequitable Conduct 
Doctrine, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 723, 729 (2009) (proposing minimizing the remedy); Eric E. 
Johnson, The Case for Eliminating Patent Law’s Inequitable Conduct Defense, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 
ONLINE 1, 14 (2017) (proposing eliminating the inequitable conduct defense entirely); Christian E. 
Mammen, Controlling the Plague: Reforming the Doctrine of Inequitable Conduct, 24 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1329, 1329 (2009) (proposing codified standards for materiality and intent).  
9. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2019). 
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Part I of this Comment addresses the role that disclosure of prior art 
plays in patent law, both in theory and in practice. Part II discusses the 
origins of the inequitable conduct doctrine and the development of 
unenforceability as a remedy for fraud in patent law. Part III concerns the 
origin of the codified duty to disclose prior art to the USPTO, and the 
responding evolution of inequitable conduct through the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit into its current form. Part IV 
looks to foreign jurisdictions for alternative approaches to the duty to 
disclose and finds a wide variety of practices among countries with 
advanced research sectors. Part V makes the case that it would be best to 
follow those countries that have done away with this duty entirely. 
I. THE ROLE OF DISCLOSURE IN PATENT LAW 
A. Statutory Requirements in Patent Law in Theory 
Patent law is, at its heart, all about disclosure: the essential public 
function of a patent is to disclose the invention to the world.10 The United 
States, like countries across the world, grants a legal monopoly on an 
invention to an inventor in exchange for disclosure of that invention to the 
public.11 The United States Code’s Title 35 (the U.S. patent code) requires 
that a patent be “new and useful,” and (relatedly) that it not be “obvious” 
in the light of “prior art.”12 Both novelty and non-obviousness presuppose 
some existing technology already patented or in the public domain: the 
“prior art” that is central to determining whether a person’s invention is 
entitled a patent.13 
Both the examiner and the applicant have incentives to find and submit 
prior art.14 For the applicant, it has been shown that any post-issuance 
challenge to the patent’s novelty or non-obviousness is much less likely 
to achieve success if the applicant cited the key references during 
prosecution.15 Similarly, the examiner and the office can better perform 
                                                   
10. Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539, 541 (2009). 
11. See id. 
12. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103 (2018). Modern patent law contains many features similar to the first patent 
system promulgated in Venice in 1474, such as requirements that the invention be both novel and useful. 
See Guilio Mandich, Venetian Patents (1450-1550), 30 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 166, 177 (1948). 
13. Timothy R. Holbrook, Patent Prior Art and Possession, 60 WM. & MARY L. REV. 123, 127 
(2018). Holbrook’s analysis of the confusion surrounding precisely what constitutes prior art should 
be of note to the interested reader; so too is Charles M. Hough’s more lighthearted take, which shows 
just how long this doctrine has befuddled readers. See generally Charles M. Hough, “Prior Art,” 17 
J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 401 (1935). 
14. Jay P. Kesan & Marc Banik, Patents as Incomplete Contracts: Aligning Incentives for R&D 
Investment with Incentives to Disclose Prior Art, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 23 (2000).  
15. John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents, 
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their duties if they are fully informed as to the state of the art.16 More 
information will generally result in patent claims that accurately reflect 
the scope of the invention.17 This will result in patents that not only 
withstand scrutiny, but are also not overly broad and leave space for 
future innovation.18 
Such reasoning grounds the presumption of validity, a central premise 
of the United States’s patent system.19 The presumption, in the context of 
patent infringement cases, requires courts to defer to the USPTO’s 
determinations of patent validity unless the defendant can show error by 
“clear and convincing” evidence.20 This presumption of validity 
permeates the patent system, making it easy for patentees to assert their 
rights, and correspondingly difficult for infringers to avoid penalties by 
requiring them to prove invalidity by a clear and convincing standard.21 It 
is premised on the “administrative correctness” of the USPTO—the idea 
that, because actions within the USPTO are efficient and accurate, clear 
and convincing evidence is necessary to overturn its judgements.22 One 
component of this is the idea that the examiner should have the best 
possible picture of the state of the art—something that has traditionally 
been seen as the applicant’s responsibility to ensure.23 
B. Statutory Requirements in Patent Law in Practice 
At present, it is the applicant’s duty to ensure that the Patent Examiner 
is provided with all information “known [by the applicant] to be material 
                                                   
26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 234 (1998). A patent’s validity is contingent on the invention being both novel 
and non-obvious in light of previous discoveries in that field. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102–103. 
16. See Kesan & Banik, supra note 14, at 36–37. 
17. See id. 
18. See id. 
19. See Allison & Lemley, supra note 15, at 231 (“The rationale is that the trier of fact will be 
reluctant to second-guess the Examiner about an art reference that the Examiner has already 
considered, but that the trier of fact may be willing to invalidate a patent based on information that 
was not available to the Examiner.”). 
20. Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law’s Presumption of Validity, 60 
STAN. L. REV. 45, 47 (2007). 
21. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2018) (“A patent shall be presumed valid. Each claim of a patent (whether in 
independent, dependent, or multiple dependent form) shall be presumed valid independently of the 
validity of other claims; dependent or multiple dependent claims shall be presumed valid even though 
dependent upon an invalid claim. . . . The burden of establishing invalidity of a patent or any claim 
thereof shall rest on the party asserting such invalidity.”). 
22. Applied Materials, Inc. v. Advanced Semiconductor Materials Am., Inc., 98 F.3d 1563, 1569 (Fed. 
Cir. 1996). 
23. Panel Discussion: Recent Developments in Patent Law, in PATENT PROCUREMENT AND 
EXPLOITATION 266–67 (Virginia Shook Cameron ed., 1966). 
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to patentability.”24 If an applicant fails to perform this duty, they can be 
considered to have failed to prosecute their application with candor and 
good faith—and may lose their patent rights under the doctrine of 
inequitable conduct.25 The effect is to place the burden of providing 
evidence against the applicant’s patent application on the applicant. This 
requirement has been criticized as encouraging flawed performance of the 
duty of disclosure it seeks to enforce.26 
In practice, the duty of candor imposes a far greater burden on the 
applicant than simply communicating to the office information to aid in 
prosecuting the patent. First, the applicant has to gather from any 
individual involved in the invention, or the application, any references that 
could be construed (by the courts, or by an examiner) as being “material” 
to the patentability of the application.27 Then they must submit these 
references to the office, taking care to walk the line between filing too 
many references—burying the more material references among the less—
and filing too few.28 Worse still are the costs of failing to adequately 
discharge this difficult and confusing duty, as the courts have long held 
that withholding information material to patentability constitutes 
inequitable conduct, or fraud on the USPTO.29 A court finding such 
inequitable conduct will render the patent unenforceable and therefore 
worthless.30 An electronics company that owns thousands of patents, for 
example, will need to draw attention to all of its patents that are remotely 
relevant to the current application, without submitting so many that a court 
might find they intended to camouflage the truly relevant references 
within this deluge. 
II. THE ORIGINS OF INEQUITABLE CONDUCT  
Part II presents the origin of the inequitable conduct doctrine as an 
extension of common law equity principles regarding fraud, and its 
subsequent evolution into a specialized remedy of patent invalidation for 
fraud on the USPTO. 
                                                   
24. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2019). 
25. Robert J. Goldman, Evolution of the Inequitable Conduct Defense in Patent Litigation, 7 HARV. 
J.L. & TECH. 37, 93 (1993). 
26. See generally Matthew Avery et al., The Return of the Plague: Inequitable Conduct After 
Regeneron v. Merus, 34 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 328 (2018); Johnson, supra note 8. 
27. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2019). 
28. HRICIK & MEYER, supra note 5, at 129. 
29. See J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“Once a court 
concludes that inequitable conduct occurred, all the claims—not just the particular claims to which 
the inequitable conduct is directly connected—are unenforceable.”). 
30. See id. 
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A. Fraud Comes to Patent Law 
What is today called inequitable conduct began as a simple extension 
of equity jurisdiction to revoke patents obtained by fraud.31 The United 
States Supreme Court’s first reference to this doctrine appears in Railroad 
Company v. Dubois,32 a 1870 infringement case involving a plan for 
building a bridge.33 Knowing that he had infringed the patent, the 
defendant in that case attempted to use allegations of fraud on the part of 
the patentee as a defense.34 While the Supreme Court did not accept the 
defendant’s reasoning, it did acknowledge that fraud on the patent could 
constitute a defense against infringement claims,35 asserting that “[i]t is 
impossible . . . to discover how the plaintiff’s silence on the occasion 
mentioned tended at all to show a fraud upon the Patent Office, much less 
that it constituted a fraud in law, so as to justify the court in ruling that he 
could not maintain his action.”36 This decision was followed by the lower 
courts, one of which noted that because the statutes did not authorize 
independent challenges to validity on these grounds, “a patent procured 
by fraud and collusion or by illegal procedure [could] be attacked only by 
the government.”37 In other words, a court could refuse to enforce a patent 
it knew to be procured by fraud, but a court could not invalidate the 
patent  itself.38 
This judicial neutering of patents obtained by fraud was affirmed by 
the Supreme Court in Keystone Driller Co. v. General Excavator Co.,39 
which held that the principles of equity did apply to fraud in patent law.40 
A patentee had contracted with a prior user of his technology to keep that 
prior use secret and suppress the evidence, enabling him to obtain a 
                                                   
31. 1 WALKER ON PATENTS §§ 382–83 (6th ed. 1929). 
32. 79 U.S. 47 (1871). 
33. Id. at 50. 
34. Id.  
35. Id. at 63–64. 
36. Id. 
37. W. Glass Co. v. Schmertz Wire-Glass Co., 185 F. 788, 791 (7th Cir. 1911). The Western Glass 
Court followed the Supreme Court’s position at the time that the United States government had the sole 
power to invalidate or vacate patents. See United States v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 128 U.S. 315, 366 (1888).  
38. See Goldman, supra note 25, at 43. The current Patent Code allows for the presumption of 
validity to be rebutted by a showing that the patent failed to comply with the statutory requirements 
for patentability. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2018). This can be asserted as a defense in an infringement suit, as 
well as in administrative post-grant proceedings in the USPTO. Paul J. Korniczky & Elias P. Soupos, 
Considerations for Using Post-Grant Proceedings to Attack Patent Validity, 7 LANDSLIDE 34 (2014). 
39. 290 U.S. 240 (1933). 
40. Id. at 247. 
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favorable judgment in an earlier infringement case.41 Even though this 
misbehavior had occurred in a previous case, the Court agreed with the 
dismissal of the infringement claims, emphasizing that “[t]he equitable 
powers of this court can never be exerted in [sic] behalf of one who has 
acted fraudulently or who by deceit or any unfair means has gained an 
advantage.”42 Fraud became a permanent consideration of patent law, and 
succeeding years would see it evolve into an independent doctrine within 
patent law. 
B. Inequitable Conduct Evolves as a Doctrine 
While Keystone merely affirmed the dismissal of an infringement suit, 
the case stood for the proposition that fraudulent patentees could not 
enforce their patent rights.43 The Court extended this holding to cases of 
fraud committed upon the USPTO in Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-
Empire Co.44 Hazel-Atlas involved applicants who committed an 
extremely brazen form of fraud: they had found a suitably pliant expert 
who agreed to sign an article—written by the applicants—stating that their 
putative invention was “revolutionary.”45 This ensured its publication in a 
reputable trade journal, which was then submitted to the office as material 
in support of patentability.46 While the patent did issue, an ensuing 
infringement suit went against the patentees, as the defendants became 
suspicious and initiated an investigation that uncovered the fraud.47 The 
Supreme Court relied on Keystone in refusing to enforce the patent, but 
went further, suggesting that the patent be vacated (although precedent 
prevented the Court from doing so itself).48 Even if not vacated, however, 
the Court had established that a patent obtained by fraud 
was  unenforceable.49 
The Supreme Court fully characterized inequitable conduct a year later 
in Precision Instrument Manufacturing Co. v. Automotive Maintenance 
                                                   
41. Id. 
42. Id. at 245. 
43. Id. 
44. 322 U.S. 238 (1944). 
45. Id. at 240. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. at 242. 
48. Id. at 250. The Court had taken the position that because the United States had the sole power 
to grant patents, it had the sole power to take them away from their lawful holders. United States v. 
Am. Bell Tel. Co., 128 U.S. 315, 366 (1888). 
49. Hazel-Atlas, 322 U.S. at 245. 
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Machinery Co.,50 noting that applicants had “an uncompromising duty to 
report . . . all facts concerning possible fraud or inequitableness 
underlying the applications in issue.”51 The Court’s language concerning 
this new duty in Kingsland v. Dorsey52 laid down the rules by which 
applicants would now find themselves playing: applicants would 
henceforth be held to “the highest degree of candor and good faith” in 
their dealings with the office, a moral standard that would guide future 
developments in the law.53 
III. THE DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENT AND ITS EFFECT ON 
PATENT PROSECUTION 
Part III concerns the gradual establishment of codified requirements for 
the disclosure of prior art, and how those duties became wrapped within 
the duty of candor enforced by the courts through the inequitable conduct 
doctrine. This Part will also address the current relation between 
inequitable conduct and the duty to disclose prior art within the 
United  States. 
A. The Lack of an Initial Disclosure Requirement 
Just as the inequitable conduct doctrine was not fully formed by the 
courts until the postwar era,54 the codified duty to disclose prior art was 
also late to evolve. For most of its existence, the USPTO did not require 
that the applicant disclose any prior art.55 In 1974, the handbook used to 
examine patents advised examiners that the applicants would usually 
submit a “background of the invention,” ordinarily comprising a statement 
of the field of art and a description of the prior art, which included 
references to specific prior art “where applicable.”56 However, all that was 
required to be disclosed was “a complete revelation or disclosure of the 
invention.”57 Given the incentives discussed in Part I, such would seem 
reasonable: applicants had every reason to disclose prior art to best ensure 
                                                   
50. 324 U.S. 806 (1945). 
51. Id. at 818.  
52. 338 U.S. 318 (1949). 
53. Id. at 319.  
54. Id.  
55. Gina M. Bicknell, To Disclose or Not to Disclose: Duty of Candor Obligations of the United 
States and Foreign Patent Offices, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 425, 428–29 (2008). 
56. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT 
EXAMINATION PROCEDURE § 608.01(C) (3d ed. 1974) (Background of the Invention [R–41]). 
57. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT 
EXAMINATION PROCEDURE § 608 (3d ed. 1974) (Disclosure [R–35]). 
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the strengths of their patents, and the courts could handle what few cases 
of genuine fraud occurred.58 
However, the very broad guidance given by the Supreme Court towards 
inequitable conduct posed new challenges.59 The various independent 
determinations of the lower courts as to what precisely constituted 
“candor and good faith” left patent practitioners unsure of what their 
responsibilities were in the disclosure of prior art.60 One federal district 
court stated that an applicant who knew of a printed publication plainly 
describing or anticipating the claimed invention but did not disclose it 
would not be excused from assertions of inequitable conduct.61 However, 
that court then noted that the applicant had no duty to cite every 
publication they knew of, even if such a publication was likely to be 
referred to by a vigilant examiner or an opposing party in a third-party 
proceeding.62 Other courts applied different standards, from requiring 
“fault, willfulness, or bad faith,”63 to exempting practitioners who 
demonstrated good faith.64 
Contemporary authorities saw these inconsistent standards as posing a 
challenge to patent practitioners of the time.65 As one practitioner noted, 
“[t]he best solution would appear to be to disclose and make of record all 
pertinent prior art. Yet [this practice] might, it itself, be hazardous,” 
because accidental omission of earlier work could also constitute 
misrepresentation, leading the contemporaneous attorney vulnerable to 
fraud claims from that angle.66 This confusion led to calls for 
standardization in the coming years. 
B. The Institution of a Disclosure Requirement: Why? 
Confusion persisted over what prior art applicants were obligated to 
provide.67 In 1963, the Commissioner for Patents (at the time the agency 
                                                   
58. See Kesan & Banik, supra note 14, at 36–37. 
59. John W. Malley, Patent Litigation and Inferences, in PATENT PROCUREMENT AND 
EXPLOITATION 91–94 (LaDoris Morgan Whitney ed., 1963). 
60. Id. at 91–92. 
61. United States v. Standard Elec. Time Co., 155 F. Supp. 949, 952 (D. Mass. 1957). 
62. Id. 
63. See In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 538 F.2d 180, 195 
(8th Cir. 1976).  
64. See Oetiker v. Jurid Werke GMBH, 671 F.2d 596, 600 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (“A good faith 
judgment not to cite prior art to the PTO, even if erroneous, cannot be fraud.”). 
65. See Malley, supra note 59, at 92–93. 
66. Id.  
67. D. Carl Richards, Recent Developments, in PATENT LAW DEVELOPMENTS 59 (LaDoris Morgan 
Whitney ed., 1964). 
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head of the USPTO) proposed a new rule that would have required 
applicants to cite any known published art that the applicant believed to 
be “significantly pertinent” to the application.68 However, objections 
caused the Office to back down, and instead merely “advise” that 
applicants inform it of any art that would be “helpful to the Office” during 
examination.69 The asserted reasoning for this request was to aid the 
USPTO in dealing with the volume of prior art that must be searched,70 
indicating that practical considerations, as well as legal, motivated the 
Office’s decision. 
The USPTO’s 1963 attempts at instituting a mandatory duty to disclose 
prior art may have failed, but the goal received a significant shot in the 
arm from the 1967 Report of the President’s Commission on the Patent 
System.71 The Report had several broad goals, namely: (1) raising the 
quality and reliability of U.S. Patents; (2) shortening the period of 
pendency for applications; (3) accelerating the public disclosure of 
technological innovations; (4) reducing the expense of obtaining and 
litigating a patent; (5) making U.S. patent practice more compatible with 
the rest of the world; and (6) preparing the patent system for an explosion 
of new technology.72 The Report was, in many ways, remarkably 
prescient: it recommended the implementation of a first-to-file system, 
provisional applications, and published applications.73 The Report did not, 
however, recommend amending the patent regulations to require further 
disclosure of relevant art by the applicant.74 
Following on Congress’s inability to pass a patent act incorporating 
these recommendations, the USPTO’s parent agency, the Department of 
Commerce, used its institutional authority change the patent laws itself.75 
                                                   
68. Rules of Practice in Patent Cases, 28 Fed. Reg. 7513 (July 24, 1963) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1). 
69. See Richards, supra note 67.  
70. Id. at 59; see also Samuel M. Mims, Jr. et al., Panel Discussion: Recent Developments in Patent 
Law, in 1966 PATENT LAW ANNUAL 266 (Virginia S. Cameron ed., 1966) (expressing hope that 
voluntary reporting of prior art would preserve the presumption of validity, another possible rationale 
for making mandatory such disclosure). 
71. S. REP. NO. 71-184 (1967). The Commission included both public and government 
representatives. Id. at 4. 
72. Id. at 11–12. 
73. Id. at 13, 16, 24. These features, now mainstays of the American patent system, would not be 
enshrined in law for many years. See Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 
Stat. 284, 285 (2011) (moving the United States to a first-to-file system); District of Columbia 
Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501, 1536 (1999) (incorporating by reference S. 
1948, 106th Cong. (1999), requiring patent applications to be published after eighteen months); 
Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809, 4986–87 (1994) (allowing for 
the filing of provisional patent applications). 
74. See generally S. Rep. No. 71-184 (1967). 
75. Patent Examining and Appeal Procedures, 41 Fed. Reg. 43729, 43733 (Oct. 4, 1976) (to be 
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This included a key change not recommended by the President’s 
Commission: the institution of a codified duty to disclose prior art.76 
Under the guise of “codif[ying] the existing Office policy on fraud and 
inequitable conduct,” the Department amended 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 to 
require the inventor, each attorney or agent, and every other individual 
“substantively involved” in the preparation or prosecution of the 
application “to disclose to the Office information they are aware of which 
is material to the examination of the application.”77 Whether or not 
information was material was essentially left in the hands of the examiners 
and the courts. The new rule defined materiality as “where there is a 
substantial likelihood that a reasonable examiner would consider it 
important in deciding whether to allow the application to issue as 
a  patent.”78 
This rule has been revisited—it was rewritten in 1992 in order to better 
formalize the system for disclosure by providing a streamlined process for 
submitting the required references79—but the overall duty has not 
changed.80 The applicant is required to disclose information material to 
patentability of pending claims, and specifically encouraged to examine 
foreign search reports.81 Information “material to patentability” is defined 
as information “not cumulative to information already of record or being 
made of record in the application” and creating “by itself or in 
combination with other information, a prima facie case of unpatentability 
of a claim,” or contrary to an applicant’s argument of patentability.82 But 
these changes are relatively minor in their effect on practitioners when 
                                                   
codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1). 
76. Id. 
77. Patent Examining and Appeal Procedures, 42 Fed. Reg. 5587, 5589, 5593 (Jan. 28, 1977) (to 
be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1). 
78. Id. at 5593. 
79. Duty of Disclosure, 57 Fed. Reg. 2021 (Jan. 17, 1992) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pts. 1, 10). 
It has been suggested that a significant motivation for this change was the “plague” of inequitable 
conduct defenses in the patent courts of the time. See Mammen, supra note 8, at 1336. 
80. Compare 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2019) (“Each individual associated with the filing and prosecution 
of a patent application has a duty of candor and good faith in dealing with the Office, which includes 
a duty to disclose to the Office all information known to that individual to be material to 
patentability”), with 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (1977) (“All such individuals have a duty to disclose to the 
Office information they are aware of which is material to the examination of the application.”). 
81. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2019). 
82. Id. This regulation has been rewritten twice more since 1992, but only to keep its provisions 
coherent with other changes in the patent regulations. See Changes To Implement the Inventor’s Oath 
or Declaration Provisions of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 48776, 48788 (Aug. 
14, 2012) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1); Changes To Implement the Patent Business Goals, 65 
Fed. Reg. 54604, 54623 (Sept. 8, 2000) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1); Duty of Disclosure, 57 
Fed. Reg. 2007, 2021 (Jan. 17, 1992) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pts. 1, 10). 
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compared to the decisions of the courts, particularly the Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit. 
C. The Rise of The Federal Circuit as a Response to Confusion in the 
Circuit Courts 
Over the years, the courts had developed a test for inequitable conduct 
claims centered on the materiality of the omitted references, and the intent 
(or absence thereof) of the solicitor in omitting them.83 However, absent 
guidance from the Supreme Court, the lower courts had reached different 
conclusions regarding the thresholds for these findings.84 
With regards to materiality, the simplest and most difficult for 
infringers to show was but-for materiality: where the patent “would not 
have issued” had the misrepresentation not occurred.85 However, given 
the difficulty of proving what an examiner would have done had they 
known of the reference, other circuits adopted a more objective material 
or relevant test, where materiality would be found if the misrepresentation 
“would affect the [e]xaminer’s evaluation” of patentability.86 Still others, 
harkening back to the origins of unclean hands in equity law, held that any 
misconduct, even if completely nonmaterial to whether the patent issued, 
warranted invalidation of the patent.87 
By contrast, intent was a simpler matter, with only two conflicting 
interpretations: some courts endorsed a deliberate intent requirement, 
again holding true to doctrine’s origins in equitable fraud, while others 
allowed even gross negligence to serve as requisite intent.88 Nonetheless, 
the different standards for intent, like those for materiality, caused 
confusion on a national level. 
                                                   
83. William L. La Fuze, Prior Art in Patent Solicitation, in 1977 PATENT LAW ANNUAL 46 
(Virginia Shook Cameron, ed., 1977). 
84. Id. 
85. Id. (quoting Pfizer Co. v. FTC, 401 F.2d 574 (6th Cir. 1968)). 
86. CTS Corp. v. Piher Int’l Corp., 527 F.2d 95, 100 (7th Cir. 1975); see also SCM Corp. v. Radio 
Corp. of Am., 318 F. Supp. 433 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (rejecting application of the “but for” test due to 
impracticability). 
87. Honeywell Inc. v. Sperry Rand Corp., No. 4-67 C.I.V. 138, 1973 WL 903, at *7 (D. Minn. Oct. 
19, 1973) (“Whether the applicant’s misconduct was material in the procurement of the patent is of 
no consequence. If the conduct of the applicant is reprehensible, it matters not that it was really 
unnecessary, and the patent is unenforceable.”). 
88. Compare Scott Paper Co. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 432 F.2d 1198, 1204 (7th Cir. 1970) 
(requiring deliberate misrepresentation), with Norton v. Curtiss, 433 F.2d 779, 796 (C.C.P.A. 1970) 
(“Where public policy demands a complete and accurate disclosure it may suffice to show nothing 
more than that the misrepresentations were made in an atmosphere of gross negligence as to their 
truth.”). 
 
19 Curry.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/30/20  11:51 PM 
2020] THE DUTY TO DISCLOSE PRIOR ART 1043 
 
This confusion coincided with a widespread lack of uniformity in how 
the courts treated patent law.89 The lack of uniformity was addressed in 
the creation of the Federal Circuit, a single court of appeals for all patent 
cases (as well as other subjects that required national uniformity of 
jurisdiction).90 In its first cases involving inequitable conduct and the duty 
of candor, the Circuit seemed content with the more lax standards applied 
by one of its predecessor courts, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, 
which used gross negligence as an intent threshold. This measured 
inequitable conduct on a sliding scale of intent versus materiality, where 
a stronger showing of one requirement could compensate for weaker 
evidence of the other.91 Under this weak standard, assertions of 
inequitable conduct soon swamped the federal courts, and the Federal 
Circuit attempted to discourage claims of inequitable conduct to stem 
the tide.92 
For decades, the Federal Circuit attempted to “cure the plague” of 
spurious inequitable conduct allegations,93 which were cropping up in 
almost every major case because of the unclear standards as to what 
constituted inequitable conduct.94 The Federal Circuit raised the threshold 
to require both materiality (of the inequitable conduct, for example, of an 
omitted reference) and intent to deceive to be proven by clear and 
convincing evidence.95 When that failed to sufficiently cut off pleading of 
inequitable conduct, the court threw up procedural hurdles, holding that 
“‘[i]nequitable conduct, while a broader concept than fraud, must be pled 
with particularity’ under Rule 9(b).”96 Pleading with particularity required 
the party alleging a failure to cite prior art to allege what prior art had been 
intentionally omitted.97 Most recently, Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, 
                                                   
89. See MARION T. BENNETT, UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT: A 
HISTORY, 1982–1990, at 7–11 (1991). 
90. See id; Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 127, 96 Stat. 25, 37–
39 (1982). 
91. See Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 1984), 
abrogated by Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Driscoll 
v. Cebalo, 731 F.2d 878, 885 (Fed. Cir. 1984), abrogated by Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson 
& Co., 649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011).  
92. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988). See generally 
KangaROOS U.S.A., Inc. v. Caldor, Inc., 778 F.2d 1571, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
93. Robert D. Swanson, The Exergen and Therasense Effects, 66 STAN. L. REV. 695, 703; see also 
Mammen, supra note 8, at 1338–39 (concerning the USPTO’s efforts to combat the “plague”). 
94. See Mammen, supra note 8, at 1338. 
95. See Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
96. Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 575 F.3d 1312, 1326 (2009) (quoting Ferguson 
Beauregard/Logic Controls, Div. of Dover Resources, Inc. v. Mega Sys., LLC, 350 F.3d 1327, 1344 
(Fed. Cir. 2003)). 
97. Id. 
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Dickinson & Co.98 further heightened the burdens for proving that 
inequitable conduct had occurred, holding that “the materiality required 
to establish inequitable conduct is but-for materiality”.99 The court 
defined “but-for material” undisclosed prior art as that which “the PTO 
would not have allowed a claim had it been aware.”100 In doing so, the 
Federal Circuit explicitly criticized the USPTO’s materiality standard, 
noting that “reliance on this standard has resulted in the very problems 
this court sought to address” with regards to the flood of 
questionable references.101 
D. The Current State of Prior Art Disclosure 
The combination of the particularity requirement, and the heightened 
standards of Therasense, seem to have finally cut off the plague of 
inequitable conduct.102 As commentator Robert D. Swanson has noted, 
“[t]he prevalence of inequitable conduct claims has decreased from 17% 
to 8% of patent cases.”103 However, the debate has not ended.104 Indeed, 
some argue that the Circuit has gone too far, as the doctrinal duty of 
candor can now be reasonably characterized as excluding some actions 
that would fall afoul of 37 C.F.R. § 1.56.105 It is arguable that some actions 
the USPTO would legitimately consider misconduct will nonetheless go 
unpunished, because the Federal Circuit, and thus the Federal Courts, do 
not have the same definitions for misconduct.106 
Unfortunately, the second-order effects of the inequitable conduct 
plague persist. Because the failure to disclose prior art remains a very 
plausible ground for inequitable conduct claims, practitioners are still 
required to make difficult decisions about what art is known by all parties 
                                                   
98. 649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
99. Id. at 1291.  
100. Id.  
101. Id. at 1294. 
102. Swanson, supra note 93, at 724. 
103. Id. 
104. See generally John M. Golden, Patent Law’s Falstaff: Inequitable Conduct, the Federal 
Circuit, and Therasense, 7 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 353 (2012) (casting doubt on whether the 
Therasense effects will solve keep inequitable conduct from being a further thorn in the side of the 
Federal Circuit); Johnson, supra note 8 (arguing that the inequitable conduct defense should be 
eliminated). 
105. Swanson, supra note 93, at 724. 
106. See id.; Gideon Mark & T. Leigh Anenson, Inequitable Conduct and Walker Process Claims 
after Therasense and the America Invents Act, 16 U. PENN. J. BUS. L. 361, 380–81 (2014) (noting that 
the PTO had not yet updated Rule 56 in response to the Therasense decision). 
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within the ambit of 37 C.F.R. § 1.56.107 The USPTO’s Manual of Patent 
Examining Procedure offers some guidelines but errs, like many 
practitioners, on the side of submitting all known references if they could 
be even remotely characterized as prior art.108 In contrast, it has in the past 
been suggested by the USPTO that citing too many references without 
identifying those of particular importance could itself constitute 
inequitable conduct, if the intent was to “bur[y]” a material reference 
amidst hundreds of irrelevant documents.109 
This has resulted in confusion among patent attorneys. Practitioners 
concerned with possible inequitable conduct charges are incentivized to 
file any reference that could be construed as relevant in any sense—a 
“blizzard” of prior art filings.110 Moreover, the provided references do not 
seem to be helping the USPTO to determine either novelty or 
nonobviousness. Where applicant submissions accounted for 76% of 
references cited in a sample of patent applications, only 2% of applicant-
cited references were cited in rejections by the USPTO—compared to 
nearly 40% of examiner-cited references.111 Michael Frakes and Melissa 
Wasserman have suggested that examiners choose to focus their prior art 
comparisons on what they find themselves, trusting those references to 
provide them with the most insight in the limited time they have to 
examine the patent. This, however, undermines the purpose of prior art 
disclosure and threatens the presumption of validity that such disclosure 
was instituted to protect.112 
IV. DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS 
The United States is not unique in its duty of disclosure, but it is the 
only one of the world’s five busiest offices113 to impose this duty.114 Most 
foreign patent offices either require no duty of disclosure, or only require 
                                                   
107. See id. 
108. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT 
EXAMINATION PROCEDURE 2004(10) (rev. 08.2017, 2018). 
109. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT 
EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2002.03 (rev. 3, 1986). 
110. See Robert Brendan Taylor, Burying, 19 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 99, 127-8. 
111. Christopher A. Cotropia et al., Do Applicant Patent Citations Matter?, 42 RES. POL’Y 844, 
846–47 (2013).  
112. Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Is the Time Allocated to Review Patent 
Applications Inducing Examiners to Grant Invalid Patents?: Evidence From Micro-Level Application 
Data (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 20337, 2014). 
113. The others being China, Japan, Korea, and Europe. Patents, WORLD INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY INDICATORS 2017, 30 (2017). 
114. See infra sections IV.A–C. 
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disclosure upon the request of the examiner.115 In general, they approach 
prior art disclosure in one of three ways. Some countries, like the United 
States, impose a duty on applicants to provide their office with all known 
prior art. Other countries require more limited forms of disclosure, such 
as merely identifying material references (rather than requiring their 
submission), or only requiring the submission of the search reports carried 
out (and reported to the applicant) by other countries’ offices. Last, some 
national patent offices have done away entirely with the duty to disclose 
prior art, placing this duty on the office and the examiner. In this part, I 
will examine the practices of several foreign patent offices, all in countries 
with advanced research sectors like that of the United States.116 
A. Full Disclosure 
Israel has similar disclosure rules to the United States.117 The examiner 
can require the applicant to submit any art obtained in foreign prosecution 
as well as publications “which are known to the applicant and directly 
relate to the invention.”118 Furthermore, applicants also need to provide 
the counterpart foreign applications, and even “publications and 
references referred to in publications and references which the applicant 
is required to provide under this Article, where the examiner so 
demands.”119 Penalties are correspondingly harsh—not only can the 
Israeli Office cancel the patent, but they can also simply assign it to 
another party, and impose sanctions on any practitioner who knowingly 
did not keep the Office informed of a substantive change in the list of 
references and publications.120 
China, meanwhile, requires the submission of “reference materials 
relating to the invention,” and their patent office can require the 
                                                   
115. Jay Erstling, Patent Law and the Duty of Candor: Rethinking the Limits of Disclosure, 44 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 329, 356 (2011). 
116. The six countries chosen rank within the top twenty-five of WIPO’s 2019 Global Innovation 
Index. “Europe” as a whole is not ranked, but European countries constitute fifteen of the top twenty-
five. CORNELL UNIV. ET AL., THE GLOBAL INNOVATION INDEX 2019: CREATING HEALTHY LIVES—
THE FUTURE OF MEDICAL INNOVATION xxxiv (Soumitra Dutta et al. eds., 12th ed. 2019) [hereinafter 
GII 2019]. The GII defines an innovation as “a new or improved product or process (or combination 
thereof) that differs significantly from the unit’s previous products or processes and that has been 
made available to potential users (product) or brought into use by the unit (process).” Id. at 205. 
Crucially, this takes into account both patent and nonpatent innovations, which the patent system is 
also designed to encourage. 
117. C.f. Bicknell, supra note 55, at 461. 
118. Patents Law, 5727-1967, § 18 (2014) (Isr.). 
119. Id. 
120. Id. § 18C. 
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submission of any patent searches carried out by a foreign office.121 The 
Chinese Patent Office defines the required reference materials as those 
“which can be regarded as useful for the understanding, searching and 
examination of the invention or utility model.”122 The penalty for failing 
to do so is invalidation of the patent.123 
B. Partial Disclosure 
Other foreign offices require a limited form of prior art disclosure, with 
requirements more specific than those of the United States.124 Japan, for 
example, requires identification (though not submission) of any known art 
“related to the [] invention, that has been known to the public through 
publication at the time of filing of the patent application.”125 A more 
limited form of disclosure can be found in the European Patent Office, 
which formerly maintained no such requirement, relying solely on its own 
examiners to find and compare art with the application at hand.126 Today, 
the code has been amended to require a limited disclosure: “the results of 
any search carried out by the authority with which [a] previous application 
was filed” with a foreign office.127 The EU’s rule is still far clearer than 
any comparable rule, as it requires no exercise of discretion on the part of 
the practitioner, and is quite simple to fulfill—all that need be reported is 
the results of searches by other offices.128 A similar requirement can be 
found in the Canadian Patent Rules, where examiners may request from 
applicants any prior art cited in a counterpart foreign application, but does 
not require any submission beyond that.129 
                                                   
121. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhuanlifa (	) [Patent Law of the 
People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong. on Dec. 27, 
2008), art.  36 (2008), Chinese National Intellectual Property Administration, 
http://english.cnipa.gov.cn/lawpolicy/patentlawsregulations/915574.htm (last visited May 23, 2020). 
122. Implementing Regulations of the Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China, Rule 18(2). 
123. Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China, art. 45 (2008). 
124. See generally Bicknell, supra note 55. 
125. Tokkyo-hō [Patent Act], Act No. 121 of 1959, art. 36(4)(ii), 
http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?id=3118&vm=04&re=02. 
126. Jeffrey M. Kuhn, Information Overload at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office: Reframing 
the Duty of Disclosure in Patent Law as a Search and Filter Problem, 13 YALE J. L. & TECH. 89, 135 
(2010). 
127. European Patent Convention, Implementing Regulations to the Convention on the Grant of 
European Patents, Rule 141 (2016). 
128. Id. 
129. Patent Rules, SOR/96-423, § 29. 
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C. No Disclosure 
Other countries do not even bother to require the applicant to report the 
result of counterpart searches, even upon instruction by the office. In 
South Korea, even the requirement that applicants submit the results of 
counterpart searches does not exist.130 If necessary, the Patent 
Commissioner can assign an institution to conduct a prior art search 
themselves, but the law also leaves open the possibility of the examiner 
calling on other experts within the government for technical issues.131 
Finally, Australia provides an example of a country which has revised its 
patent laws frequently and moved wholly away from mandating applicant 
disclosure of prior art.132 Australia first imposed a duty to disclose prior 
art in 2001, but lessened this requirement over the years, until now there 
is no duty whatsoever.133 
Foreign patent offices feature a wide spectrum of disclosure 
requirements, from the strict standards of China and Israel to the more 
relaxed approach of South Korea and Australia. Yet more onerous 
disclosure requirements do not seem to have resulted in a higher-
performing innovation sector in those countries. For instance, Israel and 
South Korea’s Global Innovation scores, as ranked by the World 
Intellectual Property Organization, are nearly identical.134 
V. WHY THE UNITED STATES SHOULD AMEND THE DUTY 
OF DISCLOSURE 
There is a lesson to be learned from these comparisons: other countries 
have not imposed a duty upon the applicant to submit prior art, or have 
moved away from such a duty, and yet still maintain thriving innovation 
sectors. Meanwhile, the United States maintains its duty to disclose at 
great cost to both patentholders and the public. Following the method used 
by the European Patent Office would solve two big problems in patent 
law: the uncertain standards for inequitable conduct promulgated by the 
Federal Circuit, and the inefficiency in patent examination caused by the 
filing of needless references. 
Looking at the numerous Federal Circuit cases addressing inequitable 
conduct, it is no surprise that considerable ink has been spilled on the 
                                                   
130. KR Patent Act, art. 58(a-b). 
131. Id. 
132. See Bicknell, supra note 55, at 458 n.180. 
133. See Patents Act 1990, compilation No. 42 (2018), for the current law governing patents in 
Australia; see also Bicknell, supra note 55, at 458 n.180. 
134. See GII 2019, supra note 116, at xxxiv.  
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matter in various law journals, nor that the Federal Circuit sought to solve 
the problem by making the intent and materiality standards prohibitively 
high in Therasense.135 Yet perhaps it is not the inequitable conduct 
doctrine that was, or is, the problem. Punishing fraud in patent prosecution 
would seem to be an unalloyed good, as such fraud undermines the 
presumption of validity at the heart of our patent system.136 Whether the 
failure to disclose references to the patent office should even constitute 
fraud is another question, as courts have become decreasingly likely to 
allow for claims of fraud for the failure to disclose information (rather 
than for misrepresentations).137 That inequitable conduct became so 
central to patent litigation may indicate that the duties the office imposes 
on practitioners are impossible to conform to with any degree 
of certainty.138 
The United States is not unique in its duty of disclosure, but it is 
unusual. The vast majority of the world’s patent offices either require no 
duty of disclosure or have a much more limited form of the duty in 
comparison to the United States, such as the requirement of search reports 
from other patent offices in counterpart foreign applications.139 These 
offices primarily rely on their examiners to find prior art, yet in the United 
States, the duty of disclosure places responsibility on the applicant.140 This 
rule was an attempt to codify existing Office policies and court doctrines, 
and in doing so to provide consistency and guidance to applicants and 
patentees.141 Yet its effect has been to create an epidemic of fraud 
allegations in the patent courts,142 and to impose on practitioners a 
confusing, costly, and ineffective duty to provide the office with any 
information material to the patentability of an application.143 American 
patent attorneys must inform the USPTO of all material art throughout the 
examination process, or risk claims of inequitable conduct.144 
Furthermore, a diligent attorney in the United States must also take care 
                                                   
135. See Swanson, supra note 93, at 696. 
136. Applied Materials, Inc. v. Advanced Semiconductor Materials Am., Inc., 98 F.3d 1563, 1569 
(Fed. Cir. 1996). 
137. Kimberly D. Krawiec & Kathryn Zeiler, Common-Law Disclosure Duties and the Sin of 
Omission: Testing the Meta-Theories, 91 VA. L. REV. 1795, 1799–800 (2005). 
138. See HRICIK & MEYER, supra note 5. 
139. See Erstling supra note 115, at 356. 
140. See Bicknell supra note 55, at 436. 
141. Patent Examining and Appeal Procedure, 42 Fed. Reg. 5587, 5589 (Jan. 28, 1977) (to be 
codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1). 
142. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“[T]he habit of 
charging inequitable conduct in almost every major patent case has become an absolute plague.”). 
143. See Johnson, supra note 8, at 14 (2017). 
144. See HRICIK & MEYER, supra note 5, at 111. 
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that their clients follow suit and disclose all information they know of, 
else they may be vulnerable to the same claims and risk invalidation of 
their patents.145 
This has caused a separate plague upon patent law: the “burying” of the 
USPTO in references impose tremendous costs on the patent system.146 
Attorneys have every incentive to file a copy of every reference they are 
aware of with the USPTO. There is no penalty for doing so, and they risk 
danger—however difficult the courts make it to prove—in omitting a 
reference and opening themselves up to inequitable conduct allegations.147 
Similarly, there is no incentive to indicate which references are material 
to which claims, as it runs the risk of implying that other references could 
not be as material.148 Lastly, the benefits of providing the examiner with 
any references at all seems insignificant. This is borne out by the 
examiners themselves, who have claimed to prefer the applicant provide 
no references at all rather than burden them with “boxloads” of art that 
they are then obliged to read through.149 
As these floods of references have become increasingly ordinary, an 
unscrupulous attorney could choose to file hundreds of irrelevant 
references alongside a truly material, possibly invalidating reference, and 
hope the examiner would be unable to pick out the materiality.150 While 
this would seem to fit the definition of inequitable conduct, the heightened 
standards imposed by Therasense make it unlikely an infringer could 
effectively prove these claims as a defense. The Federal Circuit’s 
definition of “materiality” is far stricter than that used by the USPTO.151 
Proving by “clear and convincing” evidence that an attorney meant to 
deceive the patent office in this manner would be practically impossible 
absent a smoking gun.152 The examiner therefore could be induced to miss 
                                                   
145. See Christopher A. Cotropia, Modernizing Patent Law’s Inequitable Conduct Doctrine, 24 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 723, 729 (2009). 
146. See Taylor supra note 110, at 114–20. 
147. See HRICIK & MEYER, supra note 5, at 129–30. 
148. Id. at 133. 
149. David Popp et al., Time in Purgatory: Determinants of the Grant Lag for U.S. Patent 
Applications (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9518, Feb. 2003). 
150. Id. 
151. Compare 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2019), with Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 
1276, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (adopting but-for materiality as a standard). The USPTO has twice 
proposed adjustment of its definition of materiality to the Therasense standard. Revision of the Duty 
To Disclose Information in Patent Applications and Reexamination Proceedings, 81 Fed. Reg. 74,987 
(proposed Oct. 28, 2016) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1); Revision of the Materiality to Patentability 
Standard for the Duty To Disclose Information in Patent Applications, 76 Fed. Reg. 43, 631 (proposed 
July 21, 2011) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1). These changes have yet to be adopted. 
152. For example, a letter from the client instructing the attorney to bury a newly-discovered 
reference. Intent to deceive can be inferred from circumstance, but not if “there are multiple 
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a reference that, while not dispositive, would affect the scope of granted 
claims. Yet an inequitable conduct defense would likely be unable to 
prove this, as the but-for materiality standard would require the defendant 
to show that if a reasonable examiner had seen the reference, they would 
not have granted that claim.153 Inequitable conduct has its purpose in 
patent infringement suits: it is to punish those who have committed fraud 
in fact on the USPTO, not to serve as a plausible defense to every claim 
of infringement.154 
Some have proposed that these problems would best be remedied by 
eliminating the inequitable conduct defense altogether.155 However, a 
better idea would be to instead eliminate the duty of candor as it currently 
exists, and to adopt the European standard—for instance, no duty to 
disclose whatsoever, save for search reports issued by other countries. 
This would serve examiners better, because all references provided by 
applicants would be deemed relevant by another patent office, making it 
far more likely that another examiner would see them similarly. More 
importantly, it clearly indicates to the patent prosecutor which references 
need to be provided and relieves them of the need to do any inquiries 
themselves. Under this proposal, even the most diligent attorney would 
only need to forward foreign search reports to fully discharge their duty 
under the law. 
This would be a drastic step, but neither as drastic nor as foreign as it 
might seem at first. The Federal Circuit itself indicated that the USPTO’s 
standards for disclosure were too broad when they declined to adopt their 
materiality standards in Therasense.156 The USPTO claimed to have 
looked to the 1967 Report of the President’s Commission on the Patent 
System when creating the initial duty of disclosure, yet a reading of that 
document recommends no such creation. The innovations proposed by the 
commission included provisional applications, published applications, 
and a first-to-file system. These were aimed at raising the quality and 
reliability of patents, shortening the period of pendency, accelerating the 
disclosure of technological advances, reducing the expense of obtaining 
and litigating a patent. These changes made U.S. patent practice more 
                                                   
reasonable inferences that may be drawn.” Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1290. 
153. See Regeneron Pharm., Inc. v. Merus B.V., 144 F. Supp. 3d 530, 572 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), aff’d 
sub nom. Regeneron Pharm., Inc. v. Merus N.V., 864 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (finding that 
withheld references which disclose “the same benefits and results” would have prevented a reasonable 
examiner from finding certain claims patentable). 
154. See Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1294–95 (noting that the Federal Circuit’s decision was motivated 
in part with the goal of preventing inequitable conduct from becoming a rote defense to infringement). 
155. See generally Johnson, supra note 8. 
156. See Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1294–95. 
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compatible with that of other major countries and preparing the patent 
system to cope with new technologies.157 Easing prior art disclosure 
requirements would have a very similar effect. 
Removing the specter of inequitable conduct allegations from ordinary 
(non-fraudulent) patent practice will raise the reliability of patents 
because a diligent attorney will no longer be confused as to what 
constitutes their duty of disclosure. Furthermore, placing the 
responsibility of the patent search solely on the examiner will shorten the 
period of pendency, as the examiner will no longer need to consider 
applicant-submitted references of dubious relevancy. This itself will 
accelerate the disclosure of technological advances. In combination with 
the elimination or reduction in the filing of references, this will reduce the 
expense of obtaining a patent. Finally, conforming to the disclosure rules 
applicable in most of the world will make U.S. practice more compatible 
with those countries and will recognize modern technologies that have 
placed the world’s information at the fingertips of the examiner. 
CONCLUSION 
The current patent system in the United States is not fatally flawed. Yet 
while the current duty of disclosure may not be a malignant tumor, and 
Therasense may have alleviated the epidemic of inequitable conduct, our 
system is still far weaker than it could be. No party benefits from the 
current duty of disclosure. It has resulted in wasted money, confused 
practitioners, and a less predictable system than the alternative systems 
practiced by the United States’s economic partners across the globe. 
Removing the duty to disclose from our patent regulations would not just 
lift the remaining sickness from our patent laws: it would also place us in 
better harmony with the international community and recognize the 
technological advancements that have placed the world’s prior art at the 
fingertips of the patent examiner. These effects, salutary on their own, are 
also fully in accord with the motivations of the 1967 President’s 
Commission, which has been the guide for so many of our advances in the 
patent laws. For as the Commission recognized, the mission of the United 
States patent system is not simply to grant quality patents, or to reject 
those that are unworthy: it is to promote the progress of useful arts, 
translate that progress into better living standards, and in doing so, make 
the world a better place.158 The rules as they exist do not serve that 
function—indeed, they hinder it—and so they should be changed. 
                                                   
157. S. REP. NO. 71-184, at 12 (1967). 
158. Id. at 2. 
